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长学Changsha University第三届摹拟联合国The3rd ModelUnited Nation英文组English Group背景文件Background GuideStatementof theProblemThe worldis in an unusuallyprolonged andwidespread globalexpansion—thestrongest inmore thanthree decades.Economic integrationand technologicalchangehave playeda crucialpart indriving thisexpansion andsustaining itin theface of recentshocks andsome dauntinglonger-term economicpolicy challenges.Yet thereremains substantialambivalence about the benefitsof globalization.Tomany,the costsseem morecompelling thanthe benefits.The sourcesof thisambivalenceare varied.Some arefamiliar andsome new.Concerns about the distributionalimpact of trade havebeen givennew forcebythe declinein labors share ofnational income;the long-term trendof risingincomeinequality;the increasein theshare ofgoods andservices that are tradable,andtherefore of the broaderscope of the populationaffected by the pressureofcompetition;and theperceived accelerationin the pace of economic change.The greatermobility offinancial flowshas increasedthe senseamongpolicymakers in many countriesthat their jobs havebecome harder,that theyare lessthemasters of their ownfate than in the past,and that they have a diminishedabilityto shieldtheir companiesand citizensfrom volatility.But dothese changesin economiccircumstances andin perceptionsfundamentallychange whatwe knowabout the broad economicmerits ofglobalintegration Ido notbelieve thebasic economicsof thatjudgment havechanged.Few wouldargue thateconomic integrationby itselfis sufficientto achievebroad-based gainsin incomegrowth bothwithin andacross countries.The relativeprosperityof nationsreflects differentchoices madeby governmentsabout arangeof policies and institutionsbeyond therealm of trade andfinancial restrictions.Butintegration is an essentialingredient forachieving sustained growth.Reasonablepeople candisagree on the magnitudeof gainsthat canbe attributedto traderatherthan othereconomic policies.But the evidence insupport of thebroadconsensus thatopennessand integrationcontribute significantlyto bettergrowth outcomesremainscompelling.Just ascompelling is theevidenceagainst theproposition thatprotection in theform ofrestrictions on trade increasesgrowth orreduces inequality.The worldhas alotof experiencewith differentpolicies designedto slowthepaceof integrationor toinsulateparts of the economyfrom itseffects,and thesepolicies havegenerally beenassociatedwith worseeconomic outcomes.The poordo notbenefit fromprotectionism.Although thebalance ofeconomic evidencehas notfundamentally changed,thepolitics aroundglobalization andintegration havebecome morechallenging.The factthat the United Statesis nowin thefifth consecutiveyear ofexpansionand thatunemployment isnow at
4.4percent doesntseem tohave madetrade anymorepopular.A recentPew pollsuggested thatthat nearlytwo-thirds ofAmericansfeel lesssecure abouttheirjobsthaninearlier generations.And manyattribute thisincreasein anxietyto trade.This phenomenonof persistentand perhapsrising ambivalenceaboutintegration in the faceof solidgrowth in average incomesis notunique to the UnitedStates.Here,as inmany countries,the politicalconsensus infavor ofeconomicopenness seemsmore fragilethan itonce was.The debateabout howto respondto thischallenge tendsto seethe economicandpolitical imperativesas inconflict.The mostappealing politicalresponse—usuallysome formof selectiverestriction on trade or investment—is generallythe optionwith the worsteconomic return.The typicalpolitical impulseis totry to addressdirectly thesource of the competitivepressure and to relieveit,but thesemeasurescannot offerlasting relief.The economicprice ofprotection,in terms of distortedincentives,reduced flexibility and broadercosts onthe economyas awhole,seemboth moresubstantial and more enduringthan anytemporary politicalbenefit.The policystrategies that offer a better longer-term returndo nottry directlytorelieve the pressures thatcome fromeconomic andfinancial integration.Instead,they focus onthebroader complementof policiesand institutionsthat improve thecapacity ofeconomies to adapt to change andto absorbshocks.Those countriesthathave experiencedthe greatestgains as the worldhas become more integratedhavebeen those with thetype ofpolicy and institutional infrastructurethat facilitateseconomicflexibilityandresilience in the faceof change.The policiesthat offerthemost promisein termsof broad-based incomegains arenot thosethat tryto provideinsulationfrom volatility,but thosethat makeit easierto livewith volatility.In therealm of macroeconomic policy,this meansfurther progress towardmonetary policycredibility andfiscal sustainability,so thatcentral banksandgovernments havethe capacityto reactto adverseshocks andmitigate thedamagethey cancause.Even with the remarkableimprovements in the conductof monetary policyaround theworld overthepasttwo decades,central banksinmanycountries donothave institutionalindependence,in laworinpractice.And manystill operateunderpolicy regimesdirected atlimiting exchangerate changes—objectives that willnecessarily conflictwith theirability toachieve pricestability,as theircapital accountsbecomeprogressively moreopen.Economies withflexible exchangerate regimesgenerallyfare betterin thefaceof adverse externalshocks.And incountries wherecentralbank credibilityis morefirmly established,monetary authoritiesare betterable to reacttoasharp fallin asset prices ora negativedemand shock.In fiscalpolicy,the samebasic pointapplies.Where fiscalsustainability is morefirmly established,governments havemore scopeto respondto adversedemandshocks byreducing taxesor increasingexpenditures.Where deficits and debtto GDPratiosare highand rising,governments haveless scopefor countercyclicalfiscalpolicy.In thesecases fiscalstimulus ismore likelyto bemet by a risein riskpremier,reducing,if notfully offsetting,the desiredbenefits togrowth.Even inthoseemerging marketsthat have seen themost impressiveprogresstowardfiscalsustainability,few havereached thepoint where they havebuilt muchofacushionagainst futureshocks.And in the UnitedStates andmany othereconomies,thedemographic changesnow workingtheir waythrough theeconomy entailvery largefuturedeficitsandconsequently verylimited fiscalroom formaneuver.The rightmacroeconomic policyframework iscrucial.But wehave cometorecognize thatother issues,traditionally theprovince ofmicroeconomics,have avitalrole incontributing toeffective macroeconomicpolicy.A criticalfactor distinguishinglong-term economicperformance amongcountries withrelatively goodmonetary andfiscalpolicies is the degreeof overallflexibility theyexhibit inlabor,product andfinancialmarkets.This is not simplyaboutthepresence orabsence ofregulation.It isafunction of the incentivesregulation createsand theextent towhich itgets in theway of competition,impedes theallocation oflabor and capital toindustries with ahigher return,favors establishedfirms,and createsbarriers tonew entrants.As thesubstantial bodyof researchon structuralreforms by the OECDhasdemonstrated,where regulationismorecompatible withflexibility,productivegrowth hasgenerally beenhigher,as technologicaladvances havebeen diffusedandadopted morerapidly.The IMFslatest WorldEconomic Outlookreports that,amongthe majoreconomies,thosewithmore flexiblelabor marketshaveseensmallerdeclines inlaborsshareof income.Open economies,of course,need strongand resilient financial systems.Asfinancial systemsdevelop and capital marketsbecome moreopen andintegrated,savings shouldbe allocatedmore efficientlyand risksdistributed morebroadly,bothwithin andacross countries.This process,however,is messyand verychallenging tomanagewell.The historyofeconomiccrises overthe lasttwo decadesis ahistory notjustof fiscalprofligacy andmonetarypolicymistakes,but offinancial systemweakness—often theresult ofrapid deregulationandcapitalaccount liberalization ina contextof weaksupervision anda broadgovernment guaranteeof bankliabilities.The developmentof deeperandmoreresilientfinancialmarkets is important foreconomiesto be abletocope betterwith exchangerate flexibilityandcapitalmobility.And financialstrength isan importantpart of the arsenalofmacropolicy tools,formonetary policyis lesseffective incushioning theeffects ofassetpriceand demandshocksin circumstanceswherethebanking sectoris impaired.A finaland criticaldimension of the policyframework thatisimportantto thesuccessfulmanagement ofeconomic integration isthe design of the publicor socialinfrastructure.Raising the quality ofeducational outcomesis vital,as isthedesignofthe networkof insurancemechanisms,from unemploymentinsurance andtrainingsupport,to healthcare andpension schemes.As progressivelylarger sharesof thepopulationbecomemoreexposed to thepressuresofcompetition,as economiesbecomemore flexible,governments haveto doabetterjob ofdesigning programsofassistance thatcan easethe costsof adjustment.These policiesandinstitutionalreforms arefundamentally theresponsibility ofnational governments.International institutionscan help,with technicalassistanceand financialsupport,but thesechallenges areessentially nationalchallenges.Thereforms of the internationalinstitutions nowunderway to make themmorerepresentative ofthe changingbalance ofeconomic activityin theworld arelaudable.And weshare acommon interest inabroad rangeof informalmechanisms forcooperationon policiesinthefinancial arena.But ultimatelyit isthequalityof thechoicesnationalgovernmentsmake thatwill determinehow theireconomies fareina moreopen globaleconomy.Global integrationisnotthe primarysource ofthe worldseconomic problems,nor canitbe theprimary solutionto them.But economicintegration cancontributesignificantly tosustainedgrowth,rising incomesand decliningpoverty rates.Themost effectivepolicy responseto theconcerns ofthose whofear theconsequences offurtherintegrationisto directmore politicalcapital to the challengeof developingtheeconomic andinstitutional infrastructurethatwillenable governmentsand theircitizenstoadaptmore readilytochange.History ofthe ProblemAShort HistoryoftheIntegrated FrameworkThefirst WTO Ministerial Conference,held in1996,recognized that theLeast-Developed CountriesLDCs faceddifficulties integratinginto theglobaleconomy.This ledto theadoption ofthe WTOPlan ofAction forLeast-DevelopedCountries.The followingyear,the WTOconvened aHigh LevelMeeting todiscuss thespecificneeds ofthe LDCsandtoformulate aprogramme to strengthen theirtradecapacities,including supply-side andmarket accesscapacities.The outcomeof thismeetingwas whatbecame knownastheIntegrated Frameworkfor Trade-RelatedTechnical Assistanceto Least-Developed Countriesor the IF inshort.The mainobjective ofthe IFwas to improvethecapacity ofthe LDCstoformulate,negotiate andimplement tradepolicy soas to beableto fullyintegrate intothemultilateral tradingsystem andto takeup themarket opportunitiesthis presents.Support wasoffered tothe IFby sixmajor multilateralagencies,namely theInternationalMonetary FundIMF,the InternationalTrade CentreITC,the UnitedNationsConference onTrade andDevelopment UNCTAD,theUnitedNationsDevelopment ProgramUNDP,the World Bank WBand the World TradeOrganizationWTO.The achievementsofthe IF during the earlyyears weremodest,with onlyahandful of LDCs accessingbenefits from the initiative.When the six agenciesmet in2000to reviewprogress theyadopted anumber ofrecommendations andimplementedinstitutional changestoimprovethe IFseffectiveness.Two mainobjectiveswere formulatedfor therevamped IF;firstly,to mainstreamtrade into the1LDCs PovertyReduction StrategyPapers PRSPsor similarnational developmentplans;and secondly,to assistinthecoordinated deliveryoftrade-related technicalassistance.A newtripartite governance and managementstructure wasestablished toenablethe IFto bemore country-driven andbetter coordinated.Current SituationInLDCsThe NationalEIF Focal Point FPleads the EIF processintheLDC usuallya一senior governmentofficial appointedbytheLDC andsupported bya NationalImplementationUnitNIU.The EIFDonor FacilitatorDF workswith theFP tofacilitate donorcoordinationand the donor/government dialogueontradeissues andAid forTrade.The DFis arepresentativefromthedonor communityactive insupporting anLDCs tradeagendaand isidentified bythe governmentand otherdonors.The EIFNational Steering Committee NSCisthesenior levelforum fordecision-making andcoordination amonggovernment partnersontrade,the privatesector,civil societyand thedonor community.GloballyThe EIFSteeringCommitteereviews theoverall effectivenessofthe EIF andensurestransparency ofthe EIFprocess.The SteeringCommittee is made up of allLDCs,all donorstotheTrust Fund,thesixEIF corepartner agencies,the ESand TFMex officio,and othersgranted observerstatus bytheEIFBoard.The EIFBoard isthekey decision-making bodyfor theEIF programmelooking atpolicy,financial andoperationalissues.The Boardismadeupofthree capital-based LDCand donorrepresentativeseach,members fromthe coreand observeragencies,as wellas theESand TFMexofficio.The EIFExecutive Secretariat,housed inthe WTO,works insupport ofthe EIFtogetherwiththeEIF TrustFund Manager,represented throughthe UnitedNationsOffice forProject ServicesUNOPS asselected bytheEIFBoard.Relevant WTOActionsThe Workofthe Task ForceGiventhe growinginterestintrade anddevelopment,and theweaknesses notedabove,the DevelopmentCommittee oftheWorldBank andIMF at their meetinginSeptember2005concluded3thattheIF shouldbe enhancedand providedwithadditional resources.The WorldBank staffestimated thatan amountof betweenUS$200million and$400million wouldbe neededfor an enhanced IF,based ontheneeds identifiedinthecurrent40recipient countriesand assumingthattheIF wouldbeexpanded toinclude the“IDA-only”countries.Subsequent tothis,the IFSCestablisheda Task Force to develop proposalsfor suchan enhancement,includingexpanding theIFs resourcesand scope,and makingit more effective.The TermsofReference ofthe Task Force areprovided inAppendix LThe Task Forceincluded representativesofLDCsand donorssee AppendixII forlistof membersand,after aninitial meetingchaired bythe Ambassadorof Zambia,theAmbassador ofCanada wasinvited toassume theChair.The Task Force conducteditswork intwo phases,before andafter theHong KongWTOMinisterial.In itsinitialphase the Task Forcedeveloped consensusrecommendations onits termsofreference andkey elements.These wereapproved byMinisters atHong Kong.Subsequently,the Task Force mettwelve timesbetween Januaryand May,2022,including asession tohear theviews oftheIF agencies WTO,WorldBank,UNDP,IMF,UNCTAD,ITC,To guideits substantive discussions,individual discussionpaperswere preparedby memberson scope,funding,in-country performance,and onmanagement,governanceandadministration.The TaskForce conducteda two-dayworkshop,1to2April,at Coppet,Switzerland,todevelopinitial recommendations.Inits finalmeetings theTaskForcerefined theserecommendations,a taskconsiderablyaided bycontributions madebytheIFagencies.Throughout itswork theTaskForcebenefited fromthe strongengagement ofitsmembers,ensuring thatthere wasalways alively andinformed discussion.TaskForce memberstook theirresponsibilities extremelyseriously.It wasparticularlygratifying tonote thatthere wasoften representationfrom capitalsfrom boththeLDCs anddonors aswell fromthe Genevamissions,illustrating the importanceattached tothe workoftheTaskForceby itsmembers.The TaskForce benefitedfroma strongblend ofdevelopment andtrade expertiseamong itsmembership.The pointof departurefor thesubstantivediscussionsoftheTaskForcewas theHongKong MinisterialDeclaration%which reaffirmedthe commitmentto effectively1and meaningfullyintegrate LDCsintothemultilateral tradingsystem/noted thattheMinisters attachedhigh prioritytotheeffective implementationoftheIntegrated11Framework andrecognized theurgent needtomaketheIFmoreeffectiveandtimely paragraph48,Ministers requiredtheTaskForce toreport backtotheIFSteering Committeeby30April2022so thatanenhanced IF couldbe launchedby31December
2022.It wasagreed thatthe enhanced IF shouldcomprise threespecific elements:i Increased,additional,predictable financialresources toimplement ActionMatrices;ii Strengthenedin-country capacitiesto manage,implement andmonitor theIFprocess;andiii EnhancedIF governance.TheTaskForce recognizedtheimportanceoftradeliberalization and the factthatsuch liberalizationshould leadto improvedeconomic conditionsintheLDCs andassistin meetingthe MillenniumDevelopment Goalof reducingpoverty byhalf.However therewas alsoa recognitionthat tradeliberalizationinitself wouldnot bringaboutsuch improvementsunless itwas handledinasustainable mannerandintegrated intoa countr/s overalldevelopment strategy.The ParisDeclarationon aideffectiveness wasseen asvery importantin thisprocess,and ourrecommendations drawon theseprinciples.The ParisDeclarationmakes specificcommitments inthe followingareas:
1.Strengthening partner countries nationaldevelopment strategies andassociated operationalframeworks eg,planning,budget,and performanceassessmentframeworks.
2.Increasing alignmentof aidwith partnercountries priorities,systems andproceduresand helpingtostrengthentheir capacities.
73.Enhancing donorsand partnercountries respectiveaccountability totheircitizens andparliaments for their developmentpolicies,strategiesandperformance.
4.Eliminating duplicationof effortsand rationalizingdonor activitiesto makethemas cost-effective aspossible.
5.Reforming andsimplifying donorpoliciesandprocedures toencourage7collaborative behaviorand progressivealignment withpartnercountriespriorities,systems andprocedures.
6.Defining measuresand standardsof performanceand accountabilityofpartner countrysystems inpublic financialmanagement,procurement,fiduciarysafeguards andenvironmental assessments,in linewith broadlyaccepted goodpracticesand theirquick andwidespread application.NICA NationalIntegration CouncilNIC topromote andfoster social integrationamong Singaporeansand withnew SingaporeCitizens andPermanent Residentshasbeen formed.It willbe chairedby DrVivian Balakrishnan,Minister forCommunityDevelopment,Youth andSports,and willbe composedof leadersfrom thecommunity,private sectorand government.Plans forthe formationoftheNIC werefirst announcedduringtheCommitteefor Supplydebate inFebruary,and wasannounced bythe MinisterataMinisterialCommunity WalkaboutThe NIC willencourage collaborativesocialintegrationefforts amongthe people,the publicand theprivate sectors.TheNICwill drivenew integrationinitiatives inschools,workplaces,the community,and throughthe media.Enhanced IntegratedFrameworkTheEnhanced IntegratedFramework EIFisa multi-donor programme,whichhelps least-developed countriesLDCs playa moreactive roleintheglobal tradingsystem.The programhas awider goalof promotingeconomic growthandsustainable developmentand helpingto liftmore peopleout ofpoverty.The programis currentlyhelping47LDCs worldwide,supported byamulti-donortrust fundwithafunding target of US$250million.The EIFTrust FundTheEIF programmeis supportedbyaMulti-Donor TrustFund.As ofJanuary2022,there werecontributions from22donors.Total fundingavailable stoodatapproximately US$120million,with totalpledges ofUS$182million tobedisbursed overa fiveyear period.In2022attheHigh-Level Conferencein Stockholmpledgeswere madeof upto US$170million,against atargetofUS$250million.Proposed SolutionsOncethe IFSChas approvedtheTaskForces recommendationsmore workwillneed tobe doneto fleshoutthedetails andundertake somespecific actionsso thatimplementationoftheenhancedIFcan proceedin January
2022.This workwill needtofocuson:•Institutional issues,including staffingofthe Executive Secretariat,•defining thein-country approachand programmingissues,and•launching thereplenishment process.The specificinstitutional issuesinclude:•transmitting detailsoftheenhancedIFto allstakeholders,•drafting newtermsofreference forthe IFSCandthe Board,•transforming theIFWG intotheBoard,•clarifying thestatus ofthe ExecutiveSecretariat andits relationshipwith theWTO,•drafting aservice agreementwiththeWTO,•specifying thetype ofstaff fortheExecutiveSecretariat,including draftingjobdescriptions,•initiating therecruitment processfortheCEO andother staff,and•investigating themost cost-effective methodfor managingthe trustfund.The in-country issuesthat havetobefleshed outinclude thefollowing:•detailing likelyin-country measuresneeded tosupport theFocalPointthroughthe nationalimplementation unit,•discussing therole ofdonors in-country includingthatofthedonorcoordinator,•clarifying theroles ofthe differentagencies andother stakeholders,and•working outdetails forin-country programmingwhereby thedifferent agencieswouldhaveaclearer pictureof theirpossible specificresponsibilities andhow theprocesswould work,including pre-DTIS work,preparation ofthe DTISZmainstreamingwork,preparation forand implementationof activitiesfundedthrough Tier
2.The workregarding thereplenishment processincludes:•Further clarifyingthe costestimates,and•Fixing adate forand organizinga pledgingconference.。